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Hard Law, Soft Law, and Non-Law in Multilateral Arms
Control: Some Compliance Hypotheses
Richard L. Williamson, Jr.*

I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the single most important issue concerning the role of law in arms
control' is whether parties are more likely to comply2 with the fundamental
Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law, and Interim Chair, Department of
International Studies. JD, Harvard Law School. The author wishes to thank the University of
Miami for its financial support, Dapo Akande, Mary Coombs, Bernard Oxman, David Sloss,
and Leonard Spector for their helpful comments, and his research assistants Jeffrey Green
and Andrea Sasse. The author previously spent two years in the State Department working
on European disarmament matters, and six years in the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency working on nuclear nonproliferation.
No effort is made here to distinguish arms control from disarmament, though distinctions
are possible. More significant is to differentiate arms control from two related subjects, viz.,
from peace treaties and cease-fire agreements containing provisions for demilitarized zones
or other arms limitations, and from humanitarian law. The former includes the Rush-Bagot
Agreement of 1817 between the US and Britain that restricted the number and weaponry of
warships on the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain; the 1955 Multilateral Austrian State
Treaty, 6 UST 2369 (1955); the 1990 Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to
Germany, 1696 UNTS 115 (1991); and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, reprinted in 18
ILM 362 (1979). These agreements are similar to arms control in that they limit the number,
armament, and/or location of military forces. But nations often have incentives to comply
with peace agreements that differ considerably from the kinds of incentives that may apply to
instruments more widely considered arms control. Humanitarian law (jus in bello, generally
considered a subset of the laws of war) limits the means and circumstances under which arms
can be used, with the clear implication that other uses are proper. Humanitarian law, as its
name implies, is largely designed to protect the civilian population and avoid needless
suffering among combatants. It forbids the use of some arms entirely or controls the
circumstances of their use. Arms control, in contrast, goes beyond use limitations to prohibit
manufacturing, testing, transfer, and/or possession of weapons systems, or to constrain their
number and location. Its purposes are above all to contribute to international peace by
reducing nations' concerns over the number, type, and placement of weapons-particularly
those thought to be of strategic significance or otherwise destabilizing-in the hands of
other countries. This distinction leaves some gray areas, such as the ban on any use of
chemical or biological weapons under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 26
UST 571 (1975) (hereinafter Geneva Protocol); the ban on the use of environmental
modification techniques under the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other

ChicagoJournal of International Law

obligations of a binding treaty instrument, than comply with a norm they have
indicated support for, but to which they are not legally bound.
Concluding arms control treaties does not guarantee compliance; this
should be obvious from the fact that several important multilateral arms control
agreements have been violated. Moreover, the violations were not mere
paperwork errors or delays in implementation, but were violations of the very
object and purpose of the treaties. The Soviet Union, we now know, made large
amounts of biological agents for weapons, in violation of its obligations as a
party to the Biological Weapons Convention ("BWC").3 Iraq violated the 1925
Geneva Protocol, to which it had been a party since 1931, by its extensive use of
chemical weapons against Iranian forces during the Iran-Iraq war.4 Iraq and
North Korea have both clearly violated the essence of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty ("NPT")5 by establishing programs aimed at acquiring
nuclear weapons, and by possessing significant nuclear materials and equipment
without complying with the inspection system ("safeguards") of the
6
International Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA").

2

5
6

Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, 31 UST 333 (1979) (hereinafter
Environmental Modification Treaty or ENMOD); and the ban on the use of blinding laser
weapons under Protocol IV of the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious
or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (hereinafter CCW), available online at <http://www.unog.
ch/frames/disarm/distreat/ccwprot4.pdf> (visited Mar 9, 2003). This Article makes the
somewhat arbitrary choice of putting the Geneva Protocol and the Environmental
Modification Treaty into the category of arms control, and the CCW in the humanitarian law
category.
For a discussion of what compliance means and its relationship to the related but different
concepts of implementation and effectiveness, see Peter M. Haas; Why Comply, or Some
Hypotheses in Search of an Anayst, in Edith Brown Weiss, ed, International Compliance With
Nonbinding Accords 21, 21-23, Stud Transnatl Legal Poly No 29 (ASIL 1997). See also Abram
Chayes and Antonia Chayes, On Compliance, 47 Intl Org 175 (1993).
See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 26 UST 585
(1975).
Both states were parties to the Geneva Protocol, and its prohibition on the use of poisonous
gases was thus applicable to that war. Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons against his
own citizens in the Kurdish regions did not violate the terms of the Geneva Protocol, given
Iraq's reservation at the time of accession that it was bound only with respect to other states
party to the Protocol. However, it was, of course, a clear violation of customary international
law.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 21 UST 483 (1970).
Recent revelations also indicate probable additional violations of the NPT and of North
Korea's safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and of the 1991 and 1994 agreements
concerning the nuclear situation on the Korean peninsula. North Korea has subsequently
denounced its adherence to the NPT. Whether there have been new Iraqi violations of the
NPT, the Biological Weapons Convention, and/or the UN Security Council's resolutions on
biological, chemical and nuclear weapons should become clearer as a result of inspections
and the current conflict in Iraq.
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While the record of compliance with arms control treaties is far from
perfect, it is statistically quite good. The incidents listed above are the only
confirmed violations of the object and purpose of a multilateral arms control
treaty. There has been one suspected violation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty
("LTBT") and a number of suspected violations of the Geneva Protocol and the
BWC.7 Moreover, there have been many minor violations involving reporting
requirements, compliance deadlines, and other less strategically significant
provisions. Still, major violations of treaty obligations are the exception rather
than the rule, and the overall compliance record in arms control is a good one.
Multilateral arms control agreements, and actions that might be taken
pursuant to them, are among the few ways the international community can
attempt to keep the world from becoming increasingly dangerous as the
economic and technical capacity to produce and deploy highly lethal weaponry
inevitably spreads.8 As the alternatives to arms control either appear
unrealistically optimistic or are likely to make things worse, it is hardly quixotic
for the international community to negotiate arms control agreements, and to
put forth considerable efforts to nurture and improve the resulting legal regimes,
in the belief that most countries will comply most of the time.
This Article sets forth some of the issues that arise in assessing compliance
in the arms control field, but with primary emphasis on multilateral arms
control. It then poses hypotheses concerning compliance with multilateral arms
control measures that seem to be suggested by the compliance record, and
which may merit further investigation. Finally, it concludes with some
preliminary observations on what arms control compliance may suggest for
international law and international relations theory.
II. ISSUES RELATED TO COMPLIANCE
While compliance per se is a vital issue, it is hardly the only important
question concerning the role of law in arms control.' Other matters can affect a

8

9

There have been a number of incidents in the areas of arms control and humanitarian law
involving allegations of the use of chemical or biological weapons, including Japanese use of
poisonous gas in China during World War II, Egyptian use of mustard gas in Yemen in the
early 1960s, the "yellow rain" dispute concerning Laos, the possible use of mind-altering
chemicals on Moslems retreating from Srebrenica during the civil war in Bosnia, and the
likely poisoning of wells and food by the white minority government in Rhodesia.
That is not to say that multilateral arms control regimes are the only such measures. As
discussed in this Article, there are non-law measures, and also the possibility, applied so far
only in Iraq, of action by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
To be sure, compliance with treaties and other international measures is important in many
aspects of international relations, not just arms control. Indeed, a great deal has been written
on the question of why countries comply with their international law duties. For a few
examples, see notes 2, 15, 47-54. Still, it may be worth considering the possibility that the
field of arms control, which is a sub-branch of international law generally, might be
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treaty's effectiveness, such as the degree to which essential nations become
parties to the treaty. If key parties remain outside the treaty, it increases pressure
on the other states to withdraw or to cheat. This was one of the main difficulties
with the pre-World War II Naval Agreements (to which Germany was not a
party) and is the single largest weakness of the NPT regime, as India, Pakistan,
and Israel remain nonparties.
Another important matter that impacts on compliance is the clarity of the
instrument. This was a major problem leading to disputes between the US and
the Soviet Union over the LTBT,1 ° and the controversy of whether Iraq violated
the Environmental Modification Treaty ("ENMOD") during the Persian Gulf
War."
The wisdom of the treaty provisions may also be critical to the
effectiveness of the treaty and to states' compliance. In retrospect, Article I of
the NPT should not be limited to the nuclear weapons states. Instead, all parties
should have a duty to in no way encourage or assist another state to acquire
nuclear weapons. Similarly, lack of any inspection and verification system under
the BWC was, in retrospect, an error.
Other treaty provisions, such as those dealing with reporting, investigation,
corrective action, dispute resolution, sanctions, and withdrawal, can also have an
important effect on compliance, though a discussion of them is beyond the
purposes of this Article.
III. HARD LAW, SOFT LAW, AND NON-LAW
Arms control efforts embrace a wide variety of measures. These include
"hard law" norms contained in treaties, which are binding international law, 2
nonbinding instruments commonly referred to as "soft law," and measures that
meet no conceivable definition of international law, such as a unilateral or

to
1

12

somewhat different, or even significantly different, from some other sub-branches,
particularly given that arms control touches on states' fundamental concerns with their
security. Of course, virtually all states can be expected to break their commitments if they
believe their national survival is at stake. But concerns for their security often have the
opposite effect, encouraging states to cooperate in finding peaceful solutions. Moreover,
states are likely to take a particularly dim view of other states breaking their commitments in
the security field, tending to make states cautious about doing so for fear of retaliation or
other adverse consequences.
See note 29.
There has been some discussion of whether Iraq's dumping of oil and torching of large
numbers of oil fields in Kuwait were violations of ENMOD, but the point is probably not
worth debating in the abstract, as it is beyond quibble that those actions were violations of
customary international law. For a discussion of the Iraq/Kuwait/ENMOD question, see
Bernard H. Oxman, EnvironmentalWafare, 22 Ocean Dev & Intl L 433 (1991).
Very little in the arms control field could reasonably be considered customary international
law, though, of course, such customary international law norms as might exist in the field
would be "hard law."
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mutual restraint from obtaining certain weapons where there is no agreement to
do so. 3 Trying to understand the role of law in arms control requires one to take
these distinctions into account.
Much of the interest in these categories stems from an appreciation of the
growing importance of soft law in other branches of international law, including
international environmental law and human rights. As the term is commonly
used, soft law consists of instruments that are not binding but are nevertheless
declaratory of aspirational norms of international behavior.
Documents creating soft law include instruments subordinate to a treaty
that are not per se binding but that support the purposes of the treaty regime;
unanimous or virtually unanimous resolutions of the United Nations General
Assembly ("UNGA") and other international organizations, on legal topics
which purport to declare or codify legal obligations or establish new legal norms;
and finally, understandings that in an earlier era were called "gentlemen's
agreements"-treaty-like instruments understood by the parties not to create
legal obligations. 4
Diplomats and their governments sometimes prefer concluding soft law
instruments because doing so can be easier than adopting treaties. Soft law
instruments are advantageous because they avoid constitutional and other
domestic legal requirements in most democracies for entry into force that apply
to treaties. Another commonly cited advantage is the very fact that soft law is
nonbinding, making it easier to induce a reluctant state to become a party, and
overcoming a state's fears that it might be committing itself to a course of
conduct when future circumstances are hard to foresee.
The growing use of soft law has led to the following line of inquiry: if
compliance with these soft law instruments is as good, or nearly as good, as
compliance with treaties or other forms of hard law, might it not be
advantageous to encourage their greater use? Efforts to assess compliance with
soft law norms and to compare the results to compliance with hard law have

13

14

This latter category does not have a common term in the international law and international
relations jargon. For the purposes of this Article, such measures will be termed "non-law."
There are two other arguable categories of soft law. The first consists of treaties that do not
come into force, for whatever reasons, but which seem to reflect a very widespread
consensus. In the author's view, this is not soft law, but rather, a hard law effect arising from
the interplay of the core duty of the treaty and the narrow duty of Article 18 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, reprinted in 8 ILM 679, 686 (1969) (hereinafter Vienna
Convention), which obligates those states that have ratified a treaty not to engage in acts
prior to its entry into force that would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. The other
arguable category of soft law consists of provisions in an otherwise binding treaty that are
hortatory or aspirational, or are otherwise understood by the participants to represent a
political or moral commitment, but are nonbinding at law. Little in arms control seems to
depend on whether one thinks of this category as a subset of soft law or just very mushy
hard law.
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been only partially successful, though the assessment process has revealed much
of value."
Meanwhile, state actions that are not, in any sense of the word, a species of
international law have been somewhat overlooked.16 Arms control examples
include unilateral peaceful but coercive measures, such as US sanctions against
India and Pakistan after they detonated nuclear devices in 1998; a host of
diplomatic, political, and economic cooperative measures (intelligence sharing,
mutual assistance in halting certain kinds of exports relating to weapons of mass
destruction and their delivery systems, and financial aid to foster dismantling of
particular capabilities); and finally, unilateral or parallel restraint measures that
involve no actual agreement, in which countries either avoid acquiring particular
weapons, or avoid deployments of them that might be considered provocative. 7
For our purposes, "compliance" with most non-law activities is impossible to
assess, because there is no agreement with which one is or is not complying.
There is an exception when there has been a national declaration, as happens
with some measures of unilateral or parallel restraint. Assuming adequate
information, compliance with such a declaration can then be assessed.
IV. THE DIFFERING ROLE OF LAW IN MULTILATERAL AND
BILATERAL ARMS CONTROL
The role of law in fostering compliance may be quite different in bilateral
arms control than in multilateral arms control. Bilateral nuclear arms control is
virtually synonymous with the unique case of arms control between the US and
the Soviet Union.' The most significant factor was the very real possibility of
15

16

17

18

Among the most important of these efforts are two studies done under the auspices of the
American Society of International Law, and supported respectively by the National Science
Foundation and the Ford Foundation, viz, Weiss, ed, InternationalCompliance With Nonbinding
Accords (cited in note 2), and Dinah Shelton, ed, Commitment and Compliance: The Role of NonBinding Norms in the InternationalLegal System (Oxford 2000).
That these actions or abstinence from action are neither treaties nor soft law under
international law does not, of course, preclude the possibility that they can have legal effects
on international law even when not legally binding, such as estoppel, or as a judicial
assumption of intent to comply, as happened in the Nuclear Test Cases (NZ v Fr), 1974 ICJ 457
(Dec 20).
One might arguably also include the use of force to halt the development of a weapon of
mass destruction or a relevant delivery system by a hostile state, such as the 1981 Israeli
bombing of the Osiraq reactor or the 1990 assassination in Belgium of Canadian Gerald Bull,
developer of Iraq's "supergun program," reportedly by the Mossad. But while the use of
force outside the framework of the UN Charter to deal with a particular threat caused by an
arms program in another country may help deal with a particular risk, calling such actions
arms control measures, when arms control is normally thought of as a means of helping to
maintain the peace, seems doubtful terminology.

The most important bilateral undertaking outside the US-Soviet context is the Agreement
Between the Republic ofArgentina and the Federative Republic of Brazilforthe Exclusivey Peaceful Use of
Nuclear Enegy, 1AEA Doc No INFCIRC/395 (Nov 15, 1995), which led ultimately to IAEA
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mutual destruction of both nations and their allies by thousands of
thermonuclear weapons that could be delivered by intercontinental bombers and
missiles in very short time periods. That has never been the situation facing any
other pair or group of countries. Managing the bilateral relationship, including its
arms control aspects, became a matter of urgency that few other issues could
rival. Large-scale cheating could severely upset the strategic balance, possibly
leading to nuclear war; moreover, large-scale cheating ran a high risk of being
discovered given the extraordinary intelligence resources on both sides. In
contrast, small-scale cheating, though very hard to detect, had very little strategic
utility in the US-Soviet context because the nuclear arsenals were so vast, and
because deterrence depended largely on the other side knowing your capabilities.
Those facts made effective strategic arms limitations highly verifiable by national
means, and thus considerably more feasible than many other forms of
multilateral arms control. The negotiating process was also facilitated by the two
sides being more or less evenly balanced in strategic arms, which made "parity" a
principle both could accept in guiding their negotiations. This allowed the
negotiations to avoid the severe problems that asymmetrical arms limits have
posed for the negotiation of multilateral arms limitations regimes that did not
ban weapons but only limited their numbers, such as the prewar Naval Accords,
or the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty ("CFE").
Another important difference between multilateral and bilateral arms
control derives from the nature of the agreements. While the ancient principle of
pacta sunt servanda (treaties must be complied with) applies to bilateral and
multilateral agreements alike, differences in the nature of treaties can have
consequences for compliance. In international law, it is a commonplace
observation that treaties perform functions that several instruments perform in
domestic law. Treaties may function as constitutions that set the basic
framework of the legal order, statutes that set forth norms of conduct, and
contracts that govern the relations between two parties but rarely of anyone else.
In keeping with that analogy, treaties setting forth arms control provisions
between the US and the Soviet Union were more closely analogous to contracts
than to statutes. The primary reason there was effective compliance was politicomilitary: both sides were greatly concerned as to what the other party would do
in the event that it came to believe that there had been a breach. 9 Of course, the

19

safeguards on all nuclear facilities in the two countries. See Richard L. Williamson, Jr., Law
and the H-Bomb: Strengthening the NonproliferationRegime to Impede Advanced Proliferalion,28 Cornell
Intl LJ 72, 85 n 48 (1995).
That did not mean there were no other factors. One was the need, especially in the Soviet
Union, for the political leadership to retain the support of the military. Another was the
opinion of third parties and their publics, especially in Western Europe. Also important for
the US were the opinion of its own public and the effect of noncompliance by either side on
the US Congress.
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consequences of a treaty breach and the other party's right to retaliate, for
example, are legal issues. However, countries also need to worry about
retaliation and other consequences when nonbinding political accords are
broken. Thus, it seems unlikely that a concern for international law per se was a
major independent variable. Of course, there is no way to know how often US
and Soviet leaders thought, "I can't do that, even though it would be in the
national interest and I would have domestic and international support for doing
so, as it would be illegal." 2 Available information hints that international law
was not an important factor.2 1 In short, while international law was relevant,22
compliance was achieved primarily because of concern for what the other side
might do, regardless of the legalities. Put differently, the results would likely have
been similar if humans had never invented the concept of international law.
Multilateral arms control treaties, in contrast, are more closely analogous to
statutes in domestic law, creating (or codifying) norms of general applicability. In
this respect, multilateral arms control regimes seem to operate more like other
international legal matters. Thus, a highly complex regime like the nuclear
nonproliferation regime functions somewhat like the regimes for Antarctica or
for international finance. The NPT seems less similar to the bilateral US-Soviet
Intermediate Nuclear Forces ("INF") Treaty in terms of the role of law,

21

No effort has been undertaken, to the author's knowledge, to examine all of the relevant US
and Soviet leaders concerning the occasions when critical decisions were taken, on whether
compliance with law was a major motivating factor when compared with concerns about
retaliation, or the military risk of the situation spinning out of control. Several of the most
important national leaders are dead or unwilling to speak. Autobiographies are notoriously
self-serving, and even where former officials strive for accuracy, selective memory and selfdeception are among the things that humans do very well.
The author's own experience in eight years of arms control work in the State Department

22

and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was that among working level officials,
international law itself was very rarely discussed in the context of arms control, nor did we
once get the feeling that our senior officials took the matter more seriously than we did. This
did not mean that treaties were unimportant; to the contrary, a great deal of effort went into
negotiating them and then fostering the subsequent treaty regimes they established.
However, my colleagues who worked on bilateral arms control did not spend much time
worrying about whether compliance was primarily due to opiniojuris or because both sides
were frightened of the military and diplomatic consequences of noncompliance. To the
extent they did, it was clearly the latter.
The fact that doing so would be contrary to the Anti-Ballistic Missile ("ABM") Treaty was

20

apparently a factor in the unwillingness of the Congress to fund certain "Star Wars"
programs desired by the Reagan administration. How much was due to the Congress caring
about the violation of international law and how much was due to a Democratic-controlled
Congress perceiving a political advantage is impossible to say. A related example was the
decision of President Bush in 2001 to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in accordance with its
terms, thus acting lawfully, when there was pressure to violate the Treaty.
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notwithstanding the fact that the INF Treaty and the NPT both deal with
nuclear arms.23
V. TYPES OF MEASURES USED FOR MULTILATERAL
ARMS CONTROL
The international community has not seen fit to make extensive use of soft
law in the arms control field. Instead, it has resorted primarily to hard law
instruments, mostly global in scope, negotiated with the blessing of the UN
General Assembly through the Conference on Disarmament ("CD") and its
predecessors. There are also important regional arms control agreements,
including the CFE, and several nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties ("NFZs").24
Soft law has been used in a few cases in multilateral arms control, including the
Nuclear Suppliers Group ("NSG"), the Missile Technology Control Regime
("MTCR"), the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Accord, and the Confidence
Building Measures of the Helsinki Accords, all of which look like treaties, but
which are regarded by the parties as nonbinding. 2 However, soft law remains far
less common than hard law instruments in the arms control field.
23

24

25

For a brief discussion of regime theory in the arms control context and the differences
between simple legal regimes and complex regimes, see Williamson, 28 Cornell Ind LJ at
117-18 (cited in note 18). See generally Abram Chayes and Dinah Shelton, Commentay, in
Shelton, ed, Commitment and Compliance 521 (cited in note 15).
The NFZs that have come into force to date are the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Treaty of
Rarotonga, and the Bangkok Treaty, which establish nuclear-weapon-free zones respectively
for Latin America, the South Pacific, and South-East Asia. See Treaty of Rarotonga (1986),
available online at <http://www.opanal.org/NWFZ/Rarotonga/rarotonga.htm> (visited
Mar 9, 2003). Treaties for NFZs not yet in force have also been negotiated for Africa and
Central Asia.
After extensive secret meetings, the member states of the NSG negotiated a set of guidelines,
Communication Received From Certain Member States Regarding Guidelinesfor the Export of Nuclear
Material, Equipment and Technology, IAEA Doc Nos INFCIRC/254 (Feb 1978) and
INFCIRC/254/Rev 1 (July 1992), to limit exports to non-NPT parties, to limit export of
particularly sensitive nuclear technology to anyone, and (later) to permit exports only to
states that had all of their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. The MTCR similarly
seeks to control the export of longer-range cruise and ballistic missiles and associated missile
and space technology to states of proliferation concern. See Agreement on Guidelinesfor the
Transfer of Equipment and Technology Related to Missiles, reprinted in 26 ILM 599 (1987). The
Australia Group was formed in 1984 in the wake of the use of chemical weapons in the IranIraq war, with the objective of improving controls on chemical weapons and related
chemicals and technologies. For more details, see US Dept of State, Fact Sheet-Australia
Group, available online at <http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/2001/3528.htm> (visited Mar
9, 2003). The Wassenaar Accord is the replacement for the former COCOM, redirected from
keeping militarily useful civilian goods out of the hands of the communist nations, and
instead intended to keep dual-use technologies from states of proliferation concern. See Jamil
Jaffer, Development, Strengthening the Wassenaar Export Control Regime, 3 Chi J Ind L 519, 521
(2002). The Helsinki Accords provided for Confidence Building Measures such as observers
at military exercises. See Conference on Securio and Cooperationin Europe: FinalAct, reprinted in
14 ILM 1292, 1298 (1975). The 1986 Stockholm Agreement went further and expanded the
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It is difficult to believe that the entire international community was
wrongheaded, pushing pointlessly for the extensive use of hard law instruments
when soft law would have sufficed. That suggests that there are advantages to
hard law. The advantage that would seem to matter most is that there would be
better compliance with a hard law instrument. 26 Indeed, virtualy all of the
relevant players in the efforts to ban landmines, including governments and
nongovernmental organizations, considered and rejected a soft law solution,
primarily on compliance grounds. However, in assessing the likely mix of soft
and hard law in future arms control endeavors, two cautionary notes should be
sounded. First, there is some evidence that the resort to soft law is increasing in
the arms control field.27 Second, the pace of agreement on hard law instruments
at the CD has slowed considerably. That may mean that proponents of soft law
are correct, that hard law instruments have become too hard to negotiate and
thus too cumbersome to be useful.
VI. COMPARING SOFT AND HARD LAW COMPLIANCE:
THE IMPROBABILITY OF PROOF
There are severe obstacles to a rigorous assessment of the relative
compliance pull of binding hard law instruments when compared with
nonbinding soft law in the multilateral arms control context. Above all, even

26

number and type of maneuvers that required notification and provided for nonbinding
challenge inspections. See Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Securiy Building
Measures and Disarmament in Europe (Jan 17, 1984-Sept 19, 1986), available online at <http://
www.state.gov/www/global/arms/bureaupm/csbm/stockholm_1986.html>
(visited Mar
30, 2003).
The situation is very roughly the same in bilateral arms control, where most instruments are

27

hard law treaties, but have been supplemented by non-law or occasionally soft law. Examples
include the de-targeting agreement (soft law); the decision of both countries unilaterally to
abide by the SALT I Interim Agreement after it had expired (soft law); the decision of both
to cease producing highly enriched uranium (parallel restraint); the decision of the US to
cease carrying its tactical nuclear weapons on board warships (unilateral restraint); or the
decision of President Bush in 1991 to withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from South
Korea, followed eight days later by a similar decision by President Gorbachev to do the same
from North Korea (parallel restraint, though undertaken in the spirit of the 1990-91
Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, which are soft law).
One recent example is the July 2001 soft law agreement on small arms transfers. Programme
of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light
Weapons in All Its Aspects, UN Doc No A/CONF/192/15 (2001). An even more recent
example was the successful UN-sponsored effort at The Hague to develop a nonbinding
"Code of Conduct" for missile programs and for missile-related transfers. See Statement on the
Launching of the InternationalCode of Conduct Against BallisticMissile Proliferation (Nov 25, 2002),
available online at <http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/sgstatement%20icoc.htm> (visited
Mar 30, 2003).
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assuming we had a common conception of compliance,28 we are unlikely to be
able to prove any propositions as to the relative likelihood that nations will
comply with nonbinding norms or with binding legal obligations in the arms
control field. Among the most important obstacles:
"
There is little chance of ever finding two arms control cases that are
identical, except that a hard law instrument is used in one case, and
only soft norms are involved in the other. The closest appears to be
the norm against the export of antipersonnel landmines, which is the
subject both of widely supported UNGA resolutions (soft law), and a
binding obligation under the Ottawa Landmines Treaty (hard law).
"
There can be substantial difficulties in determining whether an alleged
violation is true noncompliance, or is the consequence of ambiguity
as to the content of the norm.29 This problem is exacerbated by the
unwillingness of parties in this field to resort to judicial resolution of
their disputes, which would allow a neutral decisionmaking body to
provide authoritative answers to such questions.
"
Hard data on compliance are often unobtainable and/or subject to
debate. This problem is not unique to arms control, but it is rendered
considerably more difficult by the secrecy that usually surrounds the
military security assets of nations.
"
Compliance with some arms control norms may be difficult or
impossible, while compliance with others is exceptionally easy.3" It is
only when a state has both an incentive to violate a norm and the
28

For some of the difficulties, see Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of
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Competing Conceptions of InternationalLaw, in Weiss, ed, InternationalCompliance With Nonbinding
Accords 49 (cited in note 2).
For example, due to a difference in the translations of the word "debris" in Article I,
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paragraph 1(b) of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the US took the view that any radiation
released from an underground nuclear test that crossed an international border was a
violation, whereas the Soviet view was that there had to be fallout, for example, that the
radiation so released was reaching the earth's surface. See Treaty Banning Nuclear Testing in
the Atmosphere, Oceans, and Outer Space, 480 UNTS 43 (1963). US patrol aircraft routinely
picked up air samples containing radionuclides outside the borders of the USSR following
one of its test explosions, which routinely led to US charges that the treaty had been violated.
These were equally routinely rejected. This was not, in any significant way, a dispute over
facts, but rather an ambiguity due to translation difficulties. Under the US interpretation,
noncompliance with this provision was widespread, and under the Soviet interpretation, it
never happened (or at least the US could never prove it).
For example, the deadlines under the CWC for the complete destruction of chemical
weapons are proving impossible for Russia to meet, given the magnitude of the task and its
limited financial resources. Similarly, for want of new legislation, reporting to the
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons ("OPCW") on the US chemical
industry has not been accomplished by the treaty's deadline. In contrast, little or nothing
must be done by most states to avoid violating the Seabeds Arms Control Agreement, and
their forbearance involves no opportunity costs or other losses to national interests.
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capacity to comply or not comply that it becomes interesting to
examine why the state lives up to its obligations or violates them. For
example, all of the nearly two hundred nations in the world comply
perfectly with the norm in the Outer Space Treaty not to place
nuclear weapons in orbit, whether or not they are a party to that
treaty. However, only eight states have deployed functional nuclear
weapons to their military forces. Only six countries and a European
consortium have ever placed objects in earth orbit, and few of those
have experience with precision de-orbiting. Thus, only a tiny handful
of countries is currently in a position to place in orbit nuclear
weapons that could rapidly de-orbit on command and attack a target.
The number that could do so with concerted effort in the next few
years is still quite small. The fact, therefore, that for over thirty years,
countries like Tonga, Botswana, and Jamaica have not violated that
norm sheds no light on the role of international law in multilateral
arms control compliance. In contrast, even a single act of
noncompliance with that norm by Israel or India in the next decade
could have grave consequences. Such noncompliance would signal a
serious failure of a binding hard law instrument to restrain dangerous
developments.
Compliance with some provisions of treaties is more important than
with others. For example, many states have failed their duty under the
NPT to enter into a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. However,
this has not been a matter of major international significance, as
virtually all those noncomplying states have no nuclear materials or
equipment that would trigger the actual application of safeguards.
One could add up all the obligations in an arms control agreement and
multiply that number by the number of parties and by the years the treaty has
been in force. Adding the result for every other agreement would provide the
number of potential violation-years. Subject to data and interpretation
limitations, one could also tally all instances of significant noncompliance,
including the number of states and duration. This would allow the calculation of
a global noncompliance rate. That number would be an exceedingly tiny
percentage. But in light of the last two points above, it should be obvious that
such a noncompliance percentage would be meaningless. Noncompliance by
states actually in a position to violate the core requirements of their arms control
obligations and with an incentive to do so is still small, but hardly trivial.
Even though a rigorous scientific study of arms control compliance is not
possible, some hypotheses can be put forth. Whether they are correct will
require further consideration, but some illustrative examples are possible. While
the examples below are all taken from arms control, if the hypotheses are
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correct, they should generally be true in varying degrees for most other fields of
international relations as well.
A. CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE HARD LAW COMPLIANCE MAY BE
BETTER THAN SOFT LAW COMPLIANCE
All things being equal, hard law instruments are likely to have a substantial
compliance advantage over soft law in the multilateral arms control context in
the following circumstances.
1. Hard law will be superior to soft law where the political risk of
being labeled a lawbreaker is higher than the political risk of engaging
in legal but disfavored conduct.
In the years immediately prior to the completion of the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, China, France, India, and Pakistan were willing to accept the
political costs of violating the emerging political and ethical norm against nuclear
testing by testing underground, which they had a legal right to do. Yet none was
willing to violate the LTBT,3' even though they would have obtained more data
from open-air tests, which were also much cheaper and faster to conduct. The
only plausible explanation is that the leaders of these countries recognized that
the rest of the world would have regarded testing in violation of a longstanding
arms control and environmental treaty to be considerably worse than the testing
per se. Thus, the most important advantage of using a hard law instrument may
be that countries fear worse consequences for breaking a legal duty than for
failing to live up to a soft law norm.
2. Hard law will be superior to soft law where effective compliance
requires intrusive verification, and where that can be achieved only
through a treaty instrument.
A critical factor affecting compliance with arms control agreements is the
likelihood of being caught in the act of violating the agreement. Violations that
can be hidden from plain view, from foreign intelligence activities, and/or from
treaty-based verification measures, are more likely to occur than those that have
poor prospects of remaining hidden. This probably explains the Soviet Union's
extensive violations of the Biological Weapons Convention, which has no
verification provisions. Of course, some norms do not require any verification
measures to be effective because violations would be obvious or readily
31

During the relevant times, China, France, and India were all parties to the LTBT. Pakistan
had signed but not ratified the treaty. However, as a signatory, Pakistan arguably had a duty
under the law of treaties not to engage in acts that would defeat the object and purpose of a
treaty (in the case of the LTBT, not to conduct nuclear tests except underground). See
Article 18 of the Vienna Convention, reprinted in 8 JLM at 686 (cited in note 14).
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observed by national intelligence means. Examples might be the Outer Space
Treaty, the Seabeds Arms Control Agreement, and the Ottawa Landmines
Treaty.3 2 Treaties can also provide that any state party has inspection rights, as is
the case with the Antarctica Treaty and the CFE.
It is possible to imagine intrusive verification schemes under a soft law
regime, but in arms control there are only a few minor examples. Only hard law
has been used where the verification must be performed by an international
organization, as is done under the CWC and the NPT. National intelligence will
not suffice, because (a) it is easy to hide the materials, since only a few tons of
the right chemicals delivered by bomber or missile attack on a crowded city
would cause extensive casualties, and far smaller amounts of weapons-usable
nuclear material can cause horrific damage,33 as shown at Hiroshima and
Nagasaki; and (b) both nuclear fuel cycle and chemical synthesis facilities can be
used for either peaceful or nonpeaceful purposes. This "dual-use" capability
means that the mere existence of the facility is not sufficient evidence of
nonpeaceful intent. Overcoming these problems requires a high degree of
intrusiveness by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
("OPCW") and the IAEA respectively. Such intensive international inspection
regimes could not arise out of soft law instruments. Indeed, in the multilateral
arms control arena, mutual inspection arising from soft law has only been used
in the case of observers at military exercises under the Helsinki accords.
3. Parties are more likely to comply with a hard law treaty than with
soft law when compliance is easy, and the incentives to cheat are
modest.
The United States has some incentives to station nuclear weapons in
Puerto Rico. But it has agreed in Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco not to do
so.3 4 Its compliance with this duty depends no doubt on the fact that that treaty
has been critical to regional nuclear nonproliferation efforts, and also on the
belief that the United States should live up to its international legal obligations.
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While small-scale cheating involving landmines would be very easy, (an antipersonnel
landmine is considerably easier to manufacture than a small single-shot rifle), no one is
particularly worried about small-scale exports, as the problem with landmines was largely a
function of their very widespread use, with several million mines used in some conflicts. In
contrast, exports that would be relevant to large-scale landmine use require factories and
marketing activities that are difficult to keep hidden. The current alliance of NGOs keeping
watch on landmine activities probably suffices for this purpose (though one hears they
receive occasional tips from friendly intelligence services). See generally Human Rights

Watch, Landmine MonitorReport 2001: Toward a Mine-Free World (2001).
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For example, less than 10 kilograms of plutonium-239 is enough for a nascent nuclear
weapons program to manufacture a 15 kiloton device.
See Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin
America, 33 UST 1792 (1981).
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But it helps that it is not difficult to comply with the treaty, as the United States
has ample other locations for nuclear weapons storage and deployment, and the
incentives to cheat are therefore quite modest. But if there were only a soft law
norm, there might well be internal pressures to use only military judgments to
decide where US nuclear weapons could be deployed. A similar calculus of
incentives and alternatives probably explains why there has been no violation of
the Seabeds Arms Control Agreement. It might be militarily beneficial for a state
to place nuclear weapons on the seabed, but those military benefits are not large
enough to outweigh the costs of noncompliance.
4. Compliance may be better with a hard law treaty than with soft law
where the law or politics of some states requires a treaty instrument
before they can impose duties on nonstate actors.
Humanitarian law's restrictions on certain weaponry as contained in the
CCW and its protocols, the Rome Treaty establishing the International Criminal
Court, and the nonuse provisions of the Ottawa Landmines Treaty, are all
intended to assure that their prohibitions would be binding on everyone: not just
governments and their agents, but also on individuals and insurgent groups. In
some states, a treaty is preferable for legal reasons since the domestic law of the
state places a higher value on treaty obligations than on soft law as a basis for
adopting domestic law restrictions on private parties.35 For other states, use of a
treaty may make it easier politically to obtain domestic legislation to implement a
norm. That factor was instrumental in the US decision to place all US civilian
nuclear reactors under IAEA safeguards, and to do so utilizing a separate treaty.
The United States considered it important to submit to the safeguards
mechanism to show that it was not seeking commercial advantage for its nuclear
industry from its status as a nuclear weapon state.36 A separate, non-selfexecuting treaty assured that there would be prompt implementing legislation.
5. Compliance may be better with hard law treaties because it is easier
for treaties to provide sanctions for noncompliance or nonadherence,
or to legitimate certain countermeasures.
Formal systems of sanctions for noncompliance in the arms control field
are rare, although the NPT has something of an automatic sanction built into

35
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This is the case in several European countries and Japan. For example, the nonbinding
Nuclear Suppliers Group contains an exception for states that lack the authority to regulate
technology not contained in equipment. This provision was put in to accommodate the
Swiss. For such states, a treaty obligation may be necessary to bring about the highest level of
compliance, even where the executive authorities of a state are willing to comply.
Agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy
Agency for the Application of Agency Safeguards in the United States, 32 UST 3059 (1977).
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the treaty for parties that violate IAEA safeguards.37 Sanctions for
nonparticipation also exist. The CWC in particular forbids export of certain
chemicals to non-CWC parties. However, while uncommon, a soft law
instrument can achieve the same effect. For example, limitations on the export
of ballistic missile equipment and technology apply by their terms to non-NPT
parties under the MTCR, a nonbinding, soft law instrument. In effect, the
MTCR imposes sanctions on states for pursuing missile or space programs
without their becoming a party to the NPT. Thus, the most that can be said in
the arms control field is that the treaty instrument makes sanctions for
noncompliance and nonparticipation easier, and perhaps more effective.
However, such sanctions are uncommon, and in any event the same result can
sometimes be achieved under nonbinding instruments.
Finally, a treaty may be necessary to justify the use of countermeasures that
would otherwise be illegal. An example would be boarding and searching a ship
at sea, an otherwise unlawful action that may be justified if the ship is carrying
contraband in violation of a treaty.3 8 The recent halting by Spanish warships of a
North Korean vessel carrying SCUD missiles destined for Yemen, and the
subsequent release of the missiles on the grounds that their acquisition by
Yemen violated no treaty obligation, shows that this is not merely a hypothetical
consideration.
B. CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THERE MAY BE
LITTLE DIFFERENCE IN COMPLIANCE BETWEEN
SOFT AND HARD LAW INSTRUMENTS
Because there are so few opportunities for direct comparison, relatively
little can be said with certainty as to when compliance with treaties and soft law
norms may be equally good-or equally poor. Nevertheless, the following
propositions seem to have some support and are worth exploring.
1. Compliance with both treaties and soft law may be poor when the
norm is not genuinely accepted by the relevant state.
A state may not accept a norm contained in an instrument to which it
subscribes for several reasons. The norm may have been adopted under
pressure, and thus never genuinely accepted by the state. A state may consider
37
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Under Article III, paragraph 2 of the NPT, a nuclear exporting state must assure itself that
1AEA safeguards will apply in the importing state as a condition of the export. NPT, 21 UST
at 489 (cited in note 5). If an importing state violated safeguards, the IAEA Director General
would no longer be able to certify that safeguards would be effectively carried out in the
recipient state. While this sounds a bit abstract, the consequence is that a state dependent on
nuclear fuel, reactor parts, or heavy water imports to keep its reactors running would face a
virtually automatic cutoff of vital commodities if it violated safeguards.
The author is grateful to his colleague, Bernard Oxman, for pointing out this possibility.
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an instrument as a whole beneficial, but not a specific provision containing the
norm. Alternatively, a state may have accepted the norm initially, but then
changed military or political circumstances altered its perception of its vital
interests such that it no longer accepts the norm. Sometimes states in these
circumstances find it more advantageous to cheat than to legally withdraw.
Where that is the case, compliance with a treaty may be very poor, and it is
highly improbable that use of a soft law instrument would have yielded better
compliance. Iraq apparently entered the NPT in good faith when it ratified the
treaty in 1969, but then changed its mind sometime in the 1980s. North Korea
entered the NPT in 1985 under very heavy pressure from the Soviet Union as a
condition for further nuclear cooperation, but apparently never really accepted
the norm.
One should not conclude that a state's pressured adherence to an arms
control treaty is worthless. Often a state will eventually come to accept the
norm, even if its initial acceptance was reluctantly given. Among OECD
countries, Spain was the last non-nuclear-weapon state to adhere to the NPT
and many in its military were opposed. Yet these days, following two decades of
democratic government, Spain has become a staunch ally in global
nonproliferation efforts.
While these examples provide support for the proposition that compliance
may be equally bad where a state does not accept a norm, whether that norm is
in hard law or soft law, there are reasons to think that a treaty may be superior to
soft law in some cases. This benefit can accrue if the terms of the treaty impose
duties that are difficult to bypass. Both the Iraqi and North Korean nuclear
weapons programs were slowed and rendered considerably more expensive
because of the NPT. Iraq and North Korea had to follow strategies for
obtaining weapons-useable nuclear materials that avoided both IAEA safeguards
on all their nuclear facilities and detection by foreign intelligence services. In
Iraq's case, that meant continuing to abide by IAEA safeguards on its declared
nuclear facilities, but at the same time creating a secret uranium enrichment
program utilizing electromagnetic separation technology. Fortunately for Iraq,
the Nuclear Suppliers Gulidelines were nearly devoid of detail as to the parts and
equipment used in that technology. Focusing on electromagnetic separation
made it much less likely that Iraq's purchasing activities would come to
international attention. This turned out to be an excellent smuggling strategy, but
a poor technological one. Iraq gradually shifted the bulk of its uranium
enrichment efforts to the more promising centrifuge technology, but that
technology involved a higher risk of detection by intelligence services
monitoring the purchasing efforts by Iraqi agents abroad.
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2. Compliance with both treaties and soft law instruments may be
good when noncompliance is very difficult.
Under the Environmental Modification Treaty ("ENMOD"), it is unlawful
for any state to modify natural processes of the earth as a weapon of war.3 9
Thus, one may not cause tsunamis, hurricanes, changes in ocean currents, etc.,
for hostile purposes. As no one to date has figured out how to do those things
for any purpose, let alone create an effective weapon, compliance with the norm
has been perfect, both by parties to ENMOD and by nonparties. This does not
mean such a treaty is pointless, as it may make research by the most
technologically advanced states on such measures less likely to be approved and
funded, thus helping to assure long-term compliance. A soft law instrument
might not have as much influence on states' internal processes.
3. Compliance may be equally good where the norm enjoys very
widespread support from governments and concerned publics.
Compliance with both the Ottawa Landmines Treaty's hard law norm
against exporting antipersonnel landmines, and with the soft law UNGA
resolutions calling on all states to observe a moratorium on landmine exports,
seems to be excellent. While some states, such as the US, Russia, and China,
disagree with some of the other norms contained in the treaty and did not
become parties to it, they were prepared to accept the soft law norm against
export. This norm had exceptionally broad support among the public, as well as
among nearly all governments. Similarly, the arms control norms of the
Antarctic Treaty have been observed by all states, not just those states party to it.
C. HYPOTHESES COMPARING ONE SOFT LAW NORM
WITH ANOTHER

It may be useful to speculate on the circumstances where the chances for
compliance with soft law arms control measures might be at their greatest,
keeping in mind that the number of examples is limited.
1. Compliance with a soft law norm is likely to be better if it is
derivative of, amplifies, or interprets a binding obligation.
Among the most effective instruments are soft law instruments that are not
technically binding, but are virtually so because of their relationship to binding
norms. A good example of this is IAEA Document INFCIRC 153, which sets
forth the content of agreements to be negotiated between an NPT party and the
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See Environmental Modification Treaty, 31 UST 333 (cited in note 1).
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IAEA. 40 By its terms, it is only a decision of the IAEA Board of Governors and
does not purport to govern nations' conduct per se. However, it attains virtually
the force of a binding obligatin because each non-nuclear-weapon state party is
obliged, under Article III, paragraph (4) of the NPT, to enter into a safeguards
agreement with the IAEA. 41 Algeria tried to negotiate a safeguards agreement on
its research reactor that did not meet the terms of INFCIRC 153. It was
42
rebuffed by the JAEA, and ultimately capitulated.
2. Compliance with a soft law instrument will be better if it is a part
of a complex regime that includes hard law elements, even though
the instrument is not derived from that hard law.
Both the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control
Regime are soft law instruments that involve a tension between high stakes
international security considerations and highly lucrative commerce. Compliance
by exporters with the NSG, which are part of the highly complex nuclear
nonproliferation regime, has apparently been substantially better than
compliance with the MTCR, which is entirely self-standing-in other words
43
there is no multilateral treaty limiting ballistic missiles.
3. Compliance will be better if the soft law norm has a high moral
content, or is linked with international endeavors having a very high
degree of popular support.
Even when soft law has no juridical relationship to other instruments or
institutions, a soft law norm that supports other well-understood and widely
supported norms (whether in soft or hard law) can foster compliance. A good
40

41
42

43

See The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Ageny and States Required in Connection With
the Treay on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA Doc No INFCIRC/153 (June
1972).
NPT, 21 UST at 489 (cited in note 5).
Compare Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, which declares that the subsequent practice
of states shall be taken into account in interpreting a Treaty. Vienna Convention, reprinted in
8 ILM at 691-92 (cited in note 14). See also David Sloss, It's Not Broken, So Don't Fix It: The
InternationalAtomic Eneqy Ageny Safeguards System and the Nuclear NonproliferationTreaty, 35 Va J
Intl L 841, 853 (1995).
The US and the Soviet Union entered into treaties regulating both strategic and intermediate
nuclear-capable ballistic and cruise missiles, but these were not negotiated as multilateral
agreements. The INF has become a multilateral agreement by virtue of the demise of the
Soviet Union, as twelve of the successor states have facilities that are relevant to the INF's
limitations. See US Dept of State, Adherence to and Compliance With Arms ControlAgreements:
1998 Report Submitted to the Congress, available online at <http://www.state.gov/www/
global/arms/reports/annual/comp98.html> (visited Mar 30, 2003). The Lisbon Protocol
made the START I agreement a multilateral one for a time. However, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
and Ukraine no longer have any ballistic missiles governed by the agreement. See US Dept of
State, START I Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms, available online at <http://www.
state.gov/t/ac/rls/fs/9075.htm> (visited Mar 30, 2003).

Spring 2003

ChicagoJournalof InternalionalLaw

example of this is the Australia Group, which predates the CWC and has no
juridical link to it, but deals with the same problem of exports that might help a
chemical weapons program." Similarly, the MTCR, while legally unrelated to the
NPT, nevertheless supports it by its restrictions on provision of assistance in
ballistic missiles to states not party to the NPT.
4. Compliance with a soft law norm is more likely when only a small
group of states is needed to achieve substantial compliance.
The odds of noncompliance with a soft law norm by at least one state rise
as the number of relevant states increases. Although there have been violations
of the NSG, the Australia Group, and the MTCR, these soft law instruments
have been fairly successful, in part because when they were founded, only a few
states were technically capable of providing major assistance to nuclear,
chemical, and ballistic missile programs. There was concern that these regimes
would become wholly ineffective over time with the emergence of new
suppliers. Fortunately, most of the new suppliers have joined the respective
clubs.
D. HYPOTHESES CONCERNING UNILATERAL AND PARALLEL
RESTRAINT MEASURES AND OTHER NON-LAW MEASURES
Despite the difficulty of defining "compliance" with a nonagreement, it is
possible to put forth some hypotheses concerning unilateral and mutual
restraint, and certain other non-law measures.
1. Compliance with parallel restraint measures is likely to be poor
when a state sees military benefit in noncompliance.
The most famous incident in the multilateral context is the nuclear testing
moratorium that began in 1958. After years of failure in trying to negotiate a
multilateral nuclear test ban, the Soviets announced a unilateral decision to cease
nuclear testing. The US and Britain followed suit shortly thereafter. In August
1961, the Soviets shocked the world by resuming testing. This was widely
interpreted at the time as an effort on the Soviets' part to obtain a unilateral
advantage. If so, it was a miscalculation, as the US had anticipated the behavior
and resumed its own testing two weeks later.
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See the Australia Group website at <http://www.australiagroup.net/> (visited Mar 30,
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2. Compliance with parallel restraint measures is more likely when the
military utility of acquiring or deploying a particular armament is
modest, and the political costs of noncompliance would be large. 45
Although presumably all eight states with nuclear weapons are capable of
doing so, it appears that no state has deployed nuclear weapons designed to
increase radioactive fallout despite talk in an earlier age of "cobalt bombs"
(nuclear weapons designed to have a layer of cobalt metal that would absorb
neutrons, and thus release a large amount of Co60 , a long-lived radioactive
isotope). It is difficult to say with certainty whether this restraint reflects an
understanding of the advantages of mutual abstinence concerning such weapons;
a belief that the effects of such weapons are difficult to control and therefore
make the weapons of doubtful military utility; a concern over the political
implications of development, testing, deployment, and use of such devices; or a
recognition that any use of such weapons would almost surely violate customary
humanitarian law.46 The most likely explanation is that the restraint is the result
of a combination of these factors. A similar line of reasoning probably explains
why no nation state has deployed "dirty" radiation bombs, (non-nuclear
explosive devices that disperse specific radioisotopes or nuclear waste), though
well in excess of two-dozen nations are technically capable of manufacturing and
deploying them.
VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY

Far too little data is available to assert any lasting truths as to whether,
when, and why nations comply with their multilateral arms control obligations.
Moreover, no attempt has been made to broaden the inquiry to other areas of
international relations, where the role of law might be quite similar or may differ
considerably. Still, the experience with compliance under multilateral arms
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As discussed at note 26, unilateral and parallel restraint measures are more common in the
bilateral US-Russian and formerly US-Soviet context. That there are limits to mutual
restraint, even in the US-Russian context, can be seen in the strong Russian resistance to the
US suggestion that both sides further reduce their strategic arms without negotiating a formal
agreement. In the end, Russian insistence on a hard law instrument was accepted by the
United States, and incorporated in the Moscow agreement signed by Presidents Bush and
Putin. US-Russia Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (2002), available online at <http://
www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/2002/10471.htm> (visited Mar 30, 2003).
The weapons discussed in the text would have less military utility and cause more civilian
suffering relative to explosive power than "ordinary" nuclear weapons. See also the decision
of the ICJ in the Advisogy Opinion on the Legaliy of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, UN Doc
No A/51/218 (1996), available online at <http://www.dfat.gov.au/intorgs/icjnuc/
unan5a a.html> (visited Mar 30, 2003), and discussion by Dapo Akande, Nuclear Weapons,
UnclearLaw? Depbherinng the Nuclear Weapons Advisoy Opinion of the InternationalCourt, 68 Brit
YB Intl L 165, 203-11 (1997).
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control agreements seems to give more support to some international relations
and international law theories than to others.
The available information provides little confirmation of the more extreme
versions of the realpolilik school of international relations most closely associated
in the postwar era with Morganthau" and Kennan,4 8 and a host of neorealists. It
is true that countries do whatever they believe is necessary for their literal
survival, but short of that, they generally abide by their multilateral arms control
obligations even when doing so goes against their perceived self-interest.
There is support for Thomas Franck's hypothesis that both legitimate and
just rules pull toward compliance, but that the combination is stronger than
either alone.4 9 In that regard, the nuclear nonproliferation ideal is legitimate,
since the NPT was properly adopted as necessary for the safety and order of the
international community and virtually every nation in the world is a party to the
agreement. But in Franck's terms, it is not a just rule because it promotes or at
least tolerates the inequality of states. Many countries with no interest in
obtaining nuclear weapons are very vocal in expressing their irritation with the
nuclear powers, particularly the US and Russia, for what they construe as
inadequate progress toward the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, a
requirement of Article VI of the NPT.50 Continued rapid progress toward that
goal would reduce the inequality.51 Of course, it is not plausible that a state
would seek to acquire nuclear weapons out of such irritation alone, with no
military or political advantages accruing to the state. Certainly none of the three
critical NPT holdouts-India, Pakistan and Israel-would become party to the
treaty solely because the inequality had been greatly reduced. But the strength of
the regime depends not only on the extent of international support, but also the
depth of that support, which is something that needs continuous cultivation.
The compliance record in multilateral arms control also suggests partial
support for the views of Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley and others, developed
primarily in the context of human rights, that international law norms are an
outgrowth of liberal domestic society and not simply of national government; 2
and Harold Koh's corollary hypothesis that the role of international law depends
in part on the internalization of international law norms, a process which
"embeds international law norms into binding domestic legislation or even
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See Hans J. Morganthau, PoliticsAmong Nations (Knopf 5th ed 1973).
See George F. Kennan, American Diplomag (Chicago 1984).
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Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimagy Among Nations (Oxford 1990).
NPT, 21 UST at 490 (cited in note 5).
See Jayantha Dhanapala, The Relevance of Regimes, address before the Carnegie International
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Non-Proliferation Conference in Washington, DC (Nov 15, 2002) (Dhanapala is UnderSecretary General for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations.).
See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, InternationalLaw and International Relations Theory: A Dual
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Agenda, 87 Am J Intl L 205 (1993).
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constitutional law."53 Such liberal domestic consensus and subsequent
internalization ensures that officials will feel compelled to uphold the norms.
This process is primarily seen in liberal societies, where it supplements the other
reasons for compliance, such as fear of adverse consequences flowing from
noncompliance. But the support here is only partial, as most dictatorships
comply with multilateral arms control as well. Of course, all of the clear
violations of the core provisions of multilateral arms control limitations have
been by dictatorial governments. However, the vast majority of nonliberal
nations have violated no such norms, though many of them could have. For
those states, whose leaders have little reason to be concerned with the domestic
law implications of their actions, some other explanation is needed to explain
their compliance. The most important reasons for compliance, of course, are
politico-military, such as the risk of retaliation by the regime's enemies. Yet it
seems unlikely that such politico-military considerations fully explain the
behavior. The most likely supplemental factor is that some dictatorships have an
interest in fostering a reputation for reliability in the eyes of other governments,
even if they are not directly accountable to their own publics in the same way
democratic governments are. In that respect, the data seem to provide support
for the compliance hypothesis of theorists such as Hedley Bull and Anthony
Arend, with their emphasis on the international community as a social order
with shared expectations. 4
Finally, the data seem to support the author's view that complex regimes
have strengths that simple legal regimes do not have.55 In the "toolbox" of
diplomats, there is a proper place for treaties with binding legal obligations; for
international organizations with roles in inspection, enforcement and/or dispute
resolution; for self-standing soft law instruments; for soft law implementing
measures that draw their moral support from the treaty obligation even if not
themselves legally binding; and for a wide variety of non-law measures including
intelligence sharing, export control cooperation, financial assistance, and
unilateral and mutual restraint. A strong and active complex regime will have
many of these factors interacting at once. Because of the efficacy of such
regimes, compliance can be good even in an arena like the spread of nuclear
weapons, which is highly controversial, and which touches on vital national
security interests in ways that give some countries strong incentives to cheat.
Weaker, simpler regimes, such as that for biological weapons, have been
experiencing declining effectiveness, even though the international revulsion
toward the use of biological weapons remains very strong.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Law is no panacea for the problems that arms control seeks to address, any
more than it is for other critical international issues. No matter how much we
wish it were so, concluding arms control agreements does not guarantee
compliance with them. Yet law is clearly an important factor in compliance with
multilateral arms control agreements. Fostering effective, widely-supported
complex regimes that utilize a full complement of treaties, modified or
supplemented over time to meet changing conditions, and supported with soft
law and non-law measures, is one of the few hopes we have for making the
world a less dangerous place than it would otherwise be.
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